Introduction

For some observers in Western Europe, Bulgaria’s entry into the eurozone on 1 January 2026 has been presented as a hasty and risky move by a fragile economy toward the core of Europe. However, this reading is both incomplete and largely inaccurate.

In reality, Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro is not a sudden decision, but the natural outcome of more than twenty years of monetary discipline, institutional alignment, and gradual economic convergence. The political instability, social distrust, and fragmented public debate observed today are not the direct result of the euro, but rather manifestations of structural governance problems that existed long before the euro and have become more visible under difficult global conditions.

1. A Country Preparing for the Euro for More Than Twenty Years

Monetary Discipline: Long Before Membership

Since 1997, Bulgaria has operated under a currency board regime. The lev has been rigidly fixed at the rate of
1 EUR = 1.95583 BGN.

This arrangement is not symbolic, but highly binding. It means:

the absence of an independent monetary policy,
strict budgetary discipline,
the automatic importation of eurozone monetary conditions.

In practice, Bulgaria has lived under euro constraints for nearly thirty years, without enjoying euro privileges. Therefore, the transition in 2026 is not a monetary shock, but technical continuity.

Maastricht Criteria: Met, Not Circumvented

Before adopting the euro, Bulgaria fulfilled all convergence criteria:

Inflation: reduced to levels compatible with eurozone thresholds (approximately 2.5–2.7%) during 2024–2025.
Public debt: among the lowest in the EU, at around 24% of GDP.
Budget deficit: kept below EU limits.
Exchange-rate stability: structurally guaranteed by the currency board.
Long-term interest rates: aligned with eurozone norms.

With these indicators, Bulgaria is joining the eurozone with lower debt ratios and stricter monetary conditions than many existing members.

Schengen and the Euro: Delayed Recognition

Bulgaria’s admission to Schengen in the 2024–2025 period reflects the same logic:

standards were implemented long before official status was granted,
heavy investments were made in border security and EU cooperation,
a clear asymmetry emerged between compliance and political recognition.

In this context, Bulgaria became a de facto part of the system before being formally acknowledged.

2. Migration, Capital, and Living Standards: A Transformation That Began Before the Euro

From Forced Migration to Circular Mobility

Bulgaria has been one of Europe’s most migration-affected countries since the 1990s. Millions of people left for Western Europe. However, the narrative of permanent demographic collapse is no longer up to date.

Over the past decade, a new model has emerged:

partial or full returns,
dual-anchor lives: working abroad while investing in and partially residing in Bulgaria,
strong capital inflows into real estate, services, SMEs, and family businesses.

This process resembles the experiences observed in Portugal and Spain after EU integration. Migration has become not only a loss, but economic circulation.

Capital Returns and Investment Dynamics

Remittances, savings accumulated abroad, and EU-linked capital flows have contributed to:

urban renewal,
infrastructure improvements,
growth in consumption,
development in regions outside Sofia.

These trends began before euro adoption and continue independently of it.

Improving Living Standards Before 2026

The widespread belief that euro adoption causes a sudden deterioration in purchasing power is not supported by data:

GDP per capita (PPS): reached approximately 66% of the EU average in 2024 (around 40% at accession in 2007).
Unemployment: remained below 4%.
Growth: averaged around 2.5–3%, despite the broader European slowdown.

Living standards have been rising for years, though unevenly due to strong regional disparities.

3. Inflation and Political Instability: False Causality

Inflation: A Global Process

Price increases are real; however, attributing them to the euro is analytically misleading. Inflation in Bulgaria is consistent with global factors:

post-Covid supply shocks,
energy price volatility,
geopolitical tensions,
imported inflation across the EU.

Countries outside the eurozone have experienced similar or even higher inflation. The euro does not create inflation; it makes price comparisons more visible. The issue is perceptual, not monetary.

Political Instability: A Governance Issue, Not a Currency Issue

Governmental instability in Bulgaria is real, but structural rather than monetary:

a fragmented party system,
persistent perceptions of corruption,
low institutional trust,
recurring cycles of protest.

These problems existed long before 2026 and would persist even without the euro. Macroeconomic indicators, however, point to relative stability rather than collapse: low debt, contained deficits, and strong banking supervision.

The euro has not weakened the state; rather, it has exposed the cost of weak political mediation.

Conclusion: Normalization, Not Rupture

Bulgaria is not entering the eurozone as an unprepared peripheral economy. On the contrary, it is joining as a country that:

has applied euro discipline for decades,
has migrated, adapted, and partially returned,
improved living standards before euro adoption,
faces governance challenges unrelated to the currency itself.

Therefore, the real question is not whether Bulgaria was ready for the euro, but whether Europe was ready to recognize a reality that was already in place.

Kadir Duran
Bruxelles Korner