Introduction

China’s rapid economic growth in the 21st century and its increasing influence in the global political system have enriched its foreign policy with new geographical priorities. One such region is Central Asia. Although the region may seem relatively small in terms of geoeconomics and geopolitics, China treats Central Asia as a distinct and important area within its foreign policy.

The first reason is that the Central Asian region directly borders China’s most sensitive internal issue, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Moreover, both areas are nearly identical in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, and language; therefore, in Beijing’s view, stability in the region is a guarantee of internal security. The second reason is that Central Asia serves as the central link of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” from a geostrategic perspective. These factors compel China to develop a systematic approach toward the region in economic, security, and diplomatic dimensions.

Chinese political circles view Central Asia not merely as a component of foreign policy but as a long-term strategic space. For this reason, Beijing has established a network of specialized institutes and think tanks dedicated to studying the region: research centers on Central Asia under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, research institutes under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Xinjiang-based academic institutions, among others. Their mission is not limited to academic analysis; they also provide an analytical foundation for political decision-making, forecast risks, and formulate positions aligned with China’s long-term strategic interests. This ensures scientific grounding and strategic continuity in China’s policies toward Central Asia.

For the Central Asian states, China’s foreign policy has become a complex yet crucial factor. The countries of the region rely on Beijing’s investments, transport projects, and energy cooperation, yet they also remain cautious of risks such as excessive economic dependence on China and the potential rise of its influence over domestic political decision-making. In the coming decades, China is expected to become the region’s main economic driver and the state that shapes its transport-logistics architecture. However, the key question remains: Can China rise to the level of a principal strategic partner for the region? The answer depends directly on the degree of Russia’s influence, the extent of the U.S. response, the intra-regional integration capacity of Central Asian states, and China’s own internal political stability.

Main Part

One of the most important factors shaping China’s foreign policy toward Central Asia is the existence of an institutional foundation designed for in-depth study of the region. Over the past twenty years, China has regarded the creation of systematic knowledge about Central Asia as an integral part of its national strategy and has built a broad analytical-intellectual infrastructure. As researchers note, China’s foreign policy differs from that of many other states precisely because it relies heavily on expertise and scientific analysis (Brady, 2012).

At the center of this system stands the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The Institutes for Russian and Central Asian Studies within CAS conduct comprehensive research on political, security, and economic processes in the region. The annually published “Eurasian Blue Book” reports by CAS have become one of the key analytical sources that inform Beijing’s decisions regarding the region. According to Laruelle (2021), it is precisely CAS that forms the intellectual core of China’s policy in Central Asia and produces strategic recommendations for the government.

International research centers under Xinhua, Fudan University, and Peking University examine Central Asia’s domestic political dynamics, transport projects, and economic trends within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), providing scientifically grounded forecasts for the political elite. In addition, an important portion of analytical work on Central Asia is conducted by research institutions located in Xinjiang. This is because, for Beijing, the geopolitical significance of the region is directly linked to the security of Xinjiang. Clarke (2011) characterizes this area as China’s “strategic buffer zone” in its western direction, arguing that any instability in Central Asia is perceived as a direct threat to internal security. For this reason, the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, the Borderland Studies Institute, and other centers produce comprehensive analyses on transboundary security, religious radicalism, ethnic relations, and trade flows.

Overall, China’s think tanks on Central Asia perform several strategic functions: assessing political stability in the region, analyzing the risks and opportunities of BRI projects, monitoring the activities of Russia and the United States, and developing recommendations for soft power initiatives. China’s need for an in-depth study of Central Asia can be explained by three key factors. First, the region is directly linked to the security of the highly sensitive Xinjiang territory, where any miscalculation may lead to strategic consequences (Clarke, 2011). Second, Central Asia constitutes the main transit area of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, making the anticipation of infrastructure risks critically important (Rolland, 2017). Third, China needs to develop a larger number of stronger strategic partners in its foreign policy.

China’s foreign policy in Central Asia is characterized by the fusion of security, geoeconomic, and diplomatic influence strategies. For Beijing, the region is not merely a neighboring geographic space but a central link in its global strategies. Therefore, China’s priorities in this region extend far beyond traditional bilateral diplomacy and include managing regional security, diversifying resource and energy flows, constructing transport and logistics infrastructure, and shaping social tolerance through soft power.

Security holds a dominant position in China’s policy toward Central Asia primarily because of the geographical and ethnic linkages between Central Asia and Xinjiang. As Clarke (2011) emphasizes, any instability in the region—particularly religious extremism and separatism—is perceived by Beijing as a direct threat to China’s internal security. Therefore, China plays an active role in the regional security architecture by developing joint military exercises, information-sharing mechanisms, and counterterrorism frameworks within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to Peyrouse (2014), the SCO serves not only as a diplomatic platform for China but also as an instrument for institutionalizing its security policy and legitimizing its interests. China’s focus on regional security also aligns with the interests of Central Asian states, as they, too, support concrete mechanisms against extremism and transboundary threats.

The second major direction of China’s policy is ensuring a stable and secure long-term supply of energy resources. For example, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remain key sources of reliable oil and gas for China. Downs (2019) describes China’s energy strategy as “diversifying secure supply sources” and identifies Central Asia as an integral part of this strategy. The fact that nearly 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s gas is exported to China and that a significant share of Kazakhstan’s oil is directed to the Chinese market underscores the importance of the region for China. According to data from British Petroleum (2023), China is the largest consumer of natural gas imported from Central Asia. For China, this represents not only energy security but also an important means of reducing reliance on Russia and the Middle East.

Beijing is expanding strategic partnerships with Central Asia not only in energy but also in lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, and other green minerals. This allows China to strengthen competitiveness and resource security within the global technological industrial chain (Financial Times, 2025).

The third and most widely discussed dimension of China’s foreign policy is infrastructural cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Central Asia represents the geographic heart of this initiative, as the shortest and most stable routes for China’s access to European markets pass through the region. Rolland (2017) describes BRI projects as China’s “strategy of building a geoeconomic state,” highlighting that the infrastructure networks in Central Asia are closely connected to Beijing’s long-term global objectives. The “Khorgos Dry Port” in Kazakhstan, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, newly built highways across the region, and emerging logistics centers have become the main mechanisms of China’s economic penetration into Central Asia. This infrastructure not only improves transport efficiency but also strengthens China’s economic influence.

China’s economic expansion in Central Asia is also accompanied by large-scale investments and credit diplomacy. Kassenova (2020) notes that the total volume of Chinese investment in the region has exceeded 70 billion USD, making China the largest economic partner in Central Asia. Chinese investments are primarily directed toward infrastructure, energy, mining, and digital technologies. Although this model has intensified debates about “debt diplomacy,” empirical analyses show that the risk of a debt trap in Central Asia is lower than in many other regions (Hillman, 2021).

Another important dimension of China’s engagement in Central Asia is its soft power policy. The establishment of Confucius Institutes, Chinese grant programs, scholarships, student exchanges, and the expansion of media content are aimed at increasing Beijing’s socio-cultural acceptance in the region. As Shambaugh (2015) notes, China seeks to present itself as a “peacefully developing and reliable partner state” through its soft power initiatives. However, public perceptions of China in the region often clash with fears of economic domination, which at times limits the effectiveness of these soft power efforts.

In recent years, China has begun to actively expand not only its economic and security initiatives but also its policies on transboundary water management and ecological cooperation in Central Asia. For instance, because the Ili and Irtysh rivers flow from China into Kazakhstan, transboundary water politics have become an important diplomatic instrument for Beijing. While issues related to water flow reduction or water quality are strategic concerns for Kazakhstan, China attempts to build political trust by strengthening ecological diplomacy. Dave (2020) argues that China uses economic projects as an additional form of “soft pressure” in water-resource negotiations. Moreover, Beijing is expanding cooperation with Central Asia in areas such as ecological rehabilitation in the Aral Sea region, green technologies, atmospheric monitoring, and water-efficient agricultural practices. This not only improves China’s environmental image in the region but also increases Central Asia’s dependence on China in the sphere of the “green economy.”

China’s foreign policy toward Central Asia does not emerge on its own; it develops at the intersection of complex domestic needs, external geopolitical pressures, and global ambitions. For Beijing, the region is not only a source of economic opportunities but also an integral component of internal security, territorial integrity, and global strategic positioning. Therefore, in analyzing China’s policy toward Central Asia, internal and external factors cannot be separated — they complement each other and exert parallel influence in shaping political decisions.

Among the internal factors, one of the most significant is the issue of Xinjiang. According to Clarke (2011), any political or security decision related to Central Asia is viewed by China through the “Xinjiang prism,” since the region directly borders China’s western frontier and has long-standing ethnic, religious, and trade linkages. From Beijing’s perspective, instability in Central Asia, the activity of radical groups, or political crises may strengthen separatist sentiments within Xinjiang. For this reason, China directly links regional stability to its own internal national security. In practical terms, this is reflected in Beijing’s strict counter-extremism policies in the region and its efforts to expand security mechanisms within the SCO (Peyrouse, 2014).

External factors, meanwhile, are closely connected to China’s geopolitical ambitions. The historically strong influence of Russia in the region encourages Beijing to pursue a cautious yet carefully planned policy in Central Asia. Lo (2019) describes the regional interaction between China and Russia as “competitive cooperation”: although the two states collaborate on many issues, competition over economic influence is intensifying. While Russia maintains its dominance in the security sphere, China is becoming the region’s primary partner in economic affairs. Additionally, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan created a geopolitical vacuum for China, enabling Beijing to play a more active role in the region (Kortunov, 2021).

Another factor shaping China’s foreign policy is transboundary economic integration. Central Asia represents a major market for Chinese goods. As Kassenova (2020) notes, China is institutionalizing its economic influence in the region through investments and loans, which compels Central Asian states to maintain long-term cooperation with Beijing.

In conclusion, China’s policy in Central Asia in recent years has been shaped by economic interests, security needs, and geostrategic ambitions. The region is crucial for Beijing due to the security of Xinjiang, the transit routes of the BRI, and the opportunities to diversify energy and strategic resources. China operates across economic, diplomatic, digital, and ecological dimensions, grounding its political decisions in the analytical work of its think tanks. For the Central Asian states, China is a key source of investment and infrastructure, yet issues such as economic dependence and the dynamics of competitive cooperation with Russia require careful balancing. Overall, Beijing is pursuing a cautious yet consistent long-term strategy in the region.

References

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