In the 2024–2025 period, France faced a simultaneous eruption of both institutional and social vulnerabilities. The early election in July 2024 splintered the parliamentary majority, leading to a “hung parliament” situation. The direct consequence of this was the short lifespan of governments: Michel Barnier was ousted by a no-confidence vote in December 2024, followed by François Bayrou in September 2025. During the same period, the implemented pension reform and expected austerity measures amplified social reactions; the “Block Everything” movement transformed into street protests that received a high level of public support.

Economic indicators corroborated the instability:the CAC 40’s volatility from 2020–2024, the market response in 2024, and sharp value losses in the luxury sector made financial risks visible. A rise in public borrowing costs constrained the budgetary space. On the international stage, France’s leadership capacity within the EU and NATO was tested; analyses from Carnegie and ECFR highlighted the risk of domestic instability overshadowing Paris’s strategic commitments.

Why Is It Different This Time?

The institutions of the Fifth Republic are defined by their strong executive-driven operation; however, the 2024–2025 cycle exposed the limits of this model. President Emmanuel Macron’s decision to call an early election can be academically defined as a “high-risk strategy”: while aiming to renew the executive’s legitimacy, it fractured the legislative arithmetic and eroded long-term governability. This choice was almost a gamble, and whether it will positively affect France’s future is debatable. Although the election was held in the hope of refreshing the executive’s legitimacy, the fragmentation of parliament permanently limited its capacity to govern.

On a social level, the cumulative effect of the Yellow Vests (2018–2019) remains influential; the COVID-19 pandemic, on the other hand, provided the executive with a brief respite. To state this clearly: The current situation is reminiscent of the Yellow Vests movement. However, the COVID-19 pandemic broke the momentum of the Yellow Vests and gave Macron “a breathing space.” During the pandemic, Macron’s crisis management temporarily eased political pressure. Today, however, protests are playing a more permanent and deepening role without a similar external shock.

This periodic dynamic shows that domestic policy decisions now require a new framework in terms of both legitimacy and effectiveness.

Chronology of the Crisis and the Meaning of Parliamentary Arithmetic

The early election in July 2024 resulted in the New Popular Front (NPF) winning 182 seats, Macron’s centrist alliance 168, and the National Rally (RN) 143; no bloc achieved an absolute majority (289 seats).

Table 3: 2024 Early Election Results

The Fall of Governments: Barnier → Bayrou → Lecornu: In the post-election period, Barnier’s fall in December 2024 was a result of the parliamentary arithmetic and budget debates; Reuters and The Guardian reported this period as a loss of parliamentary power. Bayrou’s loss of confidence in September 2025 signaled a lack of productivity and legitimacy during his nine-month term; Le Monde documented this process in detail.

This arithmetic chipped away at the executive’s legitimacy and made government policy more vulnerable to street pressure.

Economic Dimension: Market Reactions, Corporate Behavior, and Public Finance

Political instability in France directly impacted the market. The closing values and annual changes of the CAC 40 were as follows: 2020: –7.1%; 2021: +28.9%; 2022: –9.5%; 2023: +16.5%; 2024: –3%.

This long-term trend reveals the index’s high volatility in the face of global shocks and domestic political tensions. In a short-term analysis highlighted by the Financial Times, the CAC 40 showed a decline of approximately 3% during the election period, and dramatic value losses, particularly in the luxury sector (LVMH ~12%; Kering ~40%), deepened this downturn. The methodological difference here is crucial: there is a time-window difference between the -3% calculated from static annual closures and the short-term -3% specific to the election period—both observations are consistent with a market response to political risk.

Furthermore, the growing budget deficit and rising 10-year bond yields have widened France’s borrowing cost differential with Germany to a historically significant level. Following Moody’s’ post-Barnier rating review, market sentiment weakened. The tendency of some large French companies to list on other stock exchanges is causing long-term questions about Paris’s financial appeal.

Economic commentary: Political uncertainty creates costs—it delays investment decisions, reroutes portfolios, and suppresses real activity in the short term. For France, this means an increase in demand for social spending at a time when public finances are contracting; this dilemma makes political choices both challenging and restrictive.

Social Dynamics: Protests, Support, and Historical Comparisons

The pension reform debates brought union mobilization and street movements back to the forefront. The “Block Everything” movement, which gained momentum with Lecornu’s inauguration on September 10, 2025, has demands that, as reported by Le Monde, are different from but related to those of the Yellow Vests: economic justice, transparency, and institutional accountability. IFOP data shows broad public support for the protests. This support not only narrows the executive’s policy space but also indirectly pressures votes within the Assembly.

Table 2: Disapproval Ratings for Macron and Bayrou

While the Yellow Vests wave challenged Macron in 2018–2019, the COVID-19 crisis made the central role of the state visible again and provided a short-term “legitimacy buffer” for the Macron administration. This strengthened the perception of the government as a crisis authority and temporarily reduced the momentum of the political opposition. However, post-pandemic economic stresses and the persistent feeling of structural injustice have re-ignited in new reform attempts. Now, an external shock no longer has the same legitimacy-boosting effect, creating a more permanent foundation for a social reaction against the government.

Political Dynamics: 49.3, Legitimacy, and Macron’s “Gamble”

Article 49.3 of the Constitution allows the executive to pass legislation without a parliamentary vote, speeding up governance. However, the frequent use of this mechanism in contemporary French political culture has fueled democratic legitimacy debates. The 49.3 interventions applied in 2024–2025 accelerated legislative processes but weakened social and parliamentary legitimacy; this, in turn, fueled the reactions on the streets.

Macron’s decision to call an early election in 2024 can be read in two ways strategically: on one hand, it was an attempt to renew his power and divide the opposition; on the other, it was a high-risk move for legitimacy restoration. If Macron’s “political gamble” had succeeded, it would have renewed executive legitimacy; if it failed, it would have eroded not only executive legitimacy but also the capacity to govern. The result, unfortunately, was the latter: the elections fragmented parliament, bringing Macron a greater legitimacy cost than any short-term gain.

International Impacts and Strategic Consequences

France has traditionally been a decisive actor within the EU and NATO; however, the domestic crisis could undermine this position. Carnegie Endowment emphasized that Macron’s decisions would determine the direction of European policy. The ECFR reported that France is at risk regarding its support for Ukraine, the European Competition Fund (€400 billion), and defense spending. In the EU Council, qualified majority rules highlight France’s population weight of ~15% (68 million); internal instability has the potential to limit the effectiveness of this weight in decision-making processes.

The New York Times wrote that the rise of the left and the far-right is deepening France’s internal polarization, which is welcomed externally—for example, in Moscow—creating strategic risks for European security. On an economic level, fiscal pressures in France risk creating tensions in intra-EU budget negotiations; in the past, similar effects from Italy in the 2018–2019 period slowed down EU processes.

While Europe works to protect itself against Putin’s aggression, its efforts to balance Trump’s unpredictable and pressuring stance have been further eroded by China‘s investment power in the region. The simultaneous economic, political, and military crises faced by France, one of the EU’s strongest states, and the rise of the far-right raise many questions about Europe’s future.

So,What Needs To Be Done Now? Options And Actions

France’s path forward must be evaluated against the risk scenario of deepening political instability, social conflict turning into economic costs, and international weakening. A strategic roadmap to mitigate these risks and re-establish legitimacy must include targeted social relief packages, institutional reform, and the transparent communication of international commitments.

The government’s priority should be to provide energy and transport support for low-income households, temporary liquidity support for struggling sectors, and direct transfers to workers who have lost wages. These steps would reduce the economic spread of strikes and buy the government time to return to the negotiating table. These measures should not contradict fiscal discipline; they should be designed to be temporary and targeted, with clear time limits. This approach plays a critical role in managing current social tensions while re-establishing government legitimacy, as urgent economic relief can soothe protest dynamics and create space for parliamentary negotiations.

Electoral System: A phased discussion of proportional representation or hybrid models. In this context, Italy’s electoral system experiences show that a coalition culture can be built with a proper transition mechanism. A similar adaptation for France could help combat the current polarization. This reform would alleviate the “hung parliament” deadlock while expanding political representation to close the legitimacy gap; however, expert commissions should be established to protect the constitutional balance during the transition process.

Parliamentary Procedures: Limiting executive bypass mechanisms like 49.3. Although they provide an advantage in rapid international decision-making, legal and procedural transparency must be increased. This would restore the balance between the legislative and executive branches and calm democratic legitimacy debates, as the frequent use of 49.3 feeds social reactions and reinforces the crisis cycle.

Tax and Social Policy: Equitable tax bracket adjustments for higher-income groups and redistributive measures (e.g., wealth tax revision, strict measures against tax evasion) can be adapted by comparing them with social policy models discussed in Manav and SCB. Swedish examples demonstrate that it is possible to combat social inequalities with effective redistributive designs; in the French context, such measures would strengthen social legitimacy. Specifically, a wealth tax revision would reduce social unrest by balancing income inequality while closing the budget deficit; this is a strategic tool for alleviating post-pandemic economic stresses.

Participatory Democracy: A firm application of citizen assemblies and regional dialogue mechanisms (Bürgerdialog examples) increases policy legitimacy; in sensitive areas such as pension reform, these participatory processes create a basis for consensus. These mechanisms would reverse the erosion of trust and legitimize “top-down” government impositions from a “bottom-up” perspective, as social participation channels protest dynamics and provides lasting stability.

France must protect its strategic commitments within the EU (e.g., contributions to the Competition Fund, support for Ukraine) with a transparent timeline. It must also develop concrete mechanisms with its European partners to share defense and Sahel burdens. This would ease budgetary pressures while preserving Paris’s international credibility. In the EU Council, qualified majority rules highlight France’s population weight; internal instability has the potential to limit the effectiveness of this weight in decision-making. This strategy prevents the internal crisis from spreading internationally and positions France as a strategic actor in the EU.

Implementation Priority and Public Opinion: A critical accompanying element of the solution is communication: it is essential for market confidence and public acceptance that the government presents its reform packages in a phased manner with concrete outcomes and transparent financing plans. This also offers a pragmatic way to close the legitimacy gap created by Macron’s “gamble” strategy, as effective communication allows the public to take ownership of reforms, thus softening political polarization.

Conclusion

The 2024–2025 cycle in France revealed a series of structural fractures that limited the executive advantages of the Fifth Republic. The simultaneous fragmentation of parliamentary arithmetic, the mass mobilization of social anger, and economic vulnerabilities challenged the government both domestically and internationally. However, this crisis is not a sudden occurrence but a more vocal reminder of a discontent whose echoes have been heard since 2018. Despite this, the crisis also functions as a driving force for reform: in addition to internal dynamics, the multiple impasses faced as an EU member—budgetary pressures, external threats, the unpredictability of partners, defense burdens, and strategic commitments—create a necessity for France to reposition itself at both national and international levels.

A rightly sequenced set of measures, institutional reforms, and transparent international commitments could put France back on a balanced path. To avoid further damage, the consolidation of the public is of critical importance. Instead of the potential for far-right extremism to destabilize the European balance, a return to the idea of a French EU could facilitate the re-establishment of both domestic legitimacy and international influence for the French government. This transformation is only possible by strengthening institutions through reform and increasing social participation.

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