The Trump administration’s October 16, 2025 announcement of a planned meeting between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest briefly sent ripples through diplomatic circles. Described as a follow-up to the Alaska Summit held in August, the proposal seemed poised to mark a new stage in Washington-Moscow engagement. Yet within weeks, officials clarified that no such meeting was currently planned. The reversal coincided with reports that President Trump had declined to authorize the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine - weaponry that would have enabled Kyiv to strike deep into Russian territory. This appeared to temper earlier rhetoric, when Trump pledged to back Ukraine’s full restoration of sovereignty.

Two weeks later, on October 30, the president declared that the United States was considering resuming nuclear testing for the first time since 1992. He justified the move by citing Russian and Chinese activities, though public records indicate that neither country has conducted nuclear tests since the 1990s.

These rapid shifts reflect a pattern that has increasingly defined Washington’s posture on the war in Ukraine: alternating signals of engagement and deterrence. The administration’s approach which can be described as part negotiation, part pressure has come to embody what many analysts are now calling the evolving “Trump Doctrine.”

When Trump took office earlier this year, he promised to negotiate an end to Europe’s largest conflict since World War II. Nearly a million troops are estimated to have been killed or wounded on both sides. Yet nine months into his term, the war grinds on, and U.S. policy remains caught between campaign ambition and geopolitical constraint.

From Optimism to Attrition

Through 2022 and 2023, many in Washington’s policy establishment believed that Russia could be strategically weakened through sustained NATO-backed Ukrainian offensives. Russia’s failed thrust toward Kyiv and Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kharkiv seemed to validate that optimism. But by mid-2024, battlefield realities had shifted.

The turning point came with Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. The operation sought to relieve pressure on the front and gain leverage for future talks. Early advances brought Ukrainian units within striking distance of a major nuclear power plant, but Russian forces regrouped quickly. Within weeks, the offensive collapsed, and according to Russian Defense Ministry claims, as many as 70,000 Ukrainian troops were encircled and forced to surrender, with limited North Korean contingents reportedly assisting Russian forces.

Many Western sources have come to acknowledge severe manpower losses for Kyiv since 2022, possibly exceeding half a million soldiers.The average age of Ukrainian troops has risen to 43, according to Time magazine. Facing mounting attrition, Ukraine has increasingly turned to long-range missile and drone strikes against Russian and occupied territories - efforts aimed at both maintaining pressure on Moscow and demonstrating endurance to Western partners.

Strategic Reassessment in Washington

In Washington, the Russia-Ukraine war is increasingly becoming as much a question of optics as of strategy. A growing faction within the administration and the broader foreign-policy community argues that U.S. involvement must be scaled back, though without appearing to signal retreat. Officials worry that an abrupt reduction in support could erode NATO’s credibility and embolden adversaries elsewhere. The administration’s compromise has been to encourage European allies to assume a greater share of the burden. Vice President J.D. Vance and several congressional leaders have called for increased European defense spending and “strategic autonomy” in security affairs. At the same time, the White House has tied trade policy such as tariff adjustments to defense cooperation, signaling a broader effort to “Europeanize” the conflict and shift its center of gravity toward the continent.

Moscow, however, has shown little inclination to compromise. Russian negotiators continue to insist on Ukraine’s permanent exclusion from NATO and formal recognition of Russian control over Crimea and the Donbass. Economic levers have proven largely ineffective; bilateral trade between the United States and Russia remains minimal under the current sanctions regime.

The Boundaries of the Trump Doctrine

Analysts describe the emerging Trump Doctrine as one of selective engagement: reducing U.S. exposure in Europe while concentrating strategic attention on the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. It reflects an attempt to reconcile Trump’s retrenchment instincts with the enduring imperatives of deterrence. Yet the doctrine’s constraints are as visible as its ambitions. Global commitments, institutional inertia, and alliance dynamics continue to limit Washington’s room to maneuver. The administration’s oscillation between diplomacy and escalation, withdrawal and projection reveals the difficulty of redefining America’s global role without relinquishing its influence.

Nine months in, the outlines of Trump’s foreign policy remain in flux. What began as a promise to end the war in Ukraine has evolved into a larger experiment: how far the United States can pivot away from Europe while still policing a balance of power it designed. The experiment itself is telling, a bid to redefine leadership without loosening control, to scale back commitments without surrendering the stage. The result is not withdrawal, but choreography.