1. Trust as the Missing Variable in EU–Türkiye Security Relations

In 2025, Türkiye’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy declarations and sanctions reached a historic low of only 4%, reflecting a deep structural asymmetry: operational cooperation remains strong, but political trust is fragile.
This tension epitomizes the paradox of the EU–Türkiye relationship — a partnership of strategic necessity without the foundation of mutual confidence.
While Türkiye continues to serve as the most active non-EU troop contributor to the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of an EU–Türkiye Information Agreement prevents the full institutionalization of security cooperation, limiting intelligence-sharing and classified data exchange.

2. Political Dialogue and Alignment under the CFSP Framework

After three years of interruption, political directors from Türkiye and the EU resumed structured dialogue in March 2025. High-level visits — including those of the European Commission President and the EU High Representative — reestablished communication channels.
Türkiye has engaged actively with EU Special Representatives on regional issues from the Horn of Africa to the Western Balkans, reflecting a pragmatic diplomatic approach.

However, despite institutional contacts, Türkiye’s policy alignment with EU foreign declarations and restrictive measures remains minimal.
While Ankara supports UN-based sanctions, it refrains from implementing EU-specific or autonomous measures. Türkiye also continues flights to Russia, hosts sanctioned entities, and maintains selective trade ties. Nevertheless, it cooperates with the EU to prevent re-export of “Common High Priority List” goods and restricts false transit to Russia via third countries.
This reflects a selective adaptation model — transactional cooperation without political convergence.

3. Legal and Institutional Obstacles: The Missing Security of Information Agreement

Since 2006, a framework arrangement has allowed Türkiye to participate in EU CSDP missions and access EU Classified Information (EUCI) on a limited basis. Yet, the absence of a full Security of Information Agreement (SIA) prevents structured intelligence cooperation, hampering coordination in crisis management, hybrid threat prevention, and defense research initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund.

Without an SIA, EU institutions and Türkiye cannot securely exchange sensitive or classified material. This perpetuates a “trust deficit,” constraining Türkiye’s role in EU defense planning and the EU’s willingness to integrate Türkiye into new security architectures.
In practice, Türkiye remains a key operational ally but a political outlier — contributing troops but excluded from the information networks shaping Europe’s defense future.

4. NATO–EU Relations and Türkiye’s Dual Role

Türkiye’s dual identity — as both a NATO ally and a CSDP partner — generates institutional friction.
While Türkiye supports NATO’s regional missions, its restrictive stance toward the participation of an EU Member State (Cyprus) in NATO cooperation continues to obstruct EU–NATO integration mechanisms.
The resumption of meetings between the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 2025 was a positive step, but Ankara’s narrow interpretation of confidentiality frameworks remains a structural obstacle to inter-organizational trust.

5. Counterterrorism, Hybrid Threats, and Disinformation Challenges

Türkiye remains an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh, sharing intelligence on foreign fighters and border management. However, the country faces persistent hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), notably from Russian sources.
Ankara’s decision not to restrict pro-Russian media has enabled disinformation narratives to penetrate its information ecosystem, undermining collective resilience within the Euro-Atlantic community.

6. Strategic Mediation and Regional Diplomacy

Despite institutional frictions, Türkiye continues to position itself as a regional mediator and crisis facilitator.
From hosting Ukraine–Russia dialogue rounds in Istanbul to leading Black Sea security initiatives with Romania and Bulgaria, Türkiye’s diplomatic agility enhances its image as a stabilizing actor.
Yet, this same independence often fuels EU skepticism, as Türkiye’s parallel diplomacy operates outside coordinated CFSP frameworks.

7. The Broader Geopolitical Context: A Multifaceted Foreign Policy

Türkiye’s global engagements — from the Gulf region to Central Asia, Africa, and South Asia — illustrate a post-Western diversification of partnerships.
Its activism in the Organization of Turkic States, balancing ties with Russia, China, and BRICS+, highlights Ankara’s aspiration for strategic autonomy.
However, these multidirectional policies often collide with EU expectations of normative alignment, complicating the trust-building required for an eventual Security of Information Agreement.

8. Security without Trust?

The absence of a formal EU–Türkiye Security of Information Agreement represents more than an administrative omission; it is the institutional manifestation of a deeper strategic ambivalence.
Türkiye’s operational contributions to EU missions underscore its indispensable role in European security, yet the lack of mutual trust blocks the pathway to true defense cooperation.
Unless political alignment and transparency improve, Türkiye will remain the EU’s “operational ally but political outsider.”
Building a foundation of trust — through structured intelligence-sharing, rule-based coordination, and genuine policy dialogue — is essential for transforming this asymmetrical relationship into a partnership anchored in both security and confidence.