Author: Emil Azikaev, 1st-year Master’s student, School of Politics and International Relations, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China.

Central Asia has shifted from policy statements to implementation. By late 2024, the region had accumulated roughly 19.83 gigawatts (GW) of renewable capacity – equivalent to about 22-23% of its total installed generation capacity (based on official national reports and statistical releases for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), marking a 45.5% increase since 2018. Auctions, public–private partnership (PPPs) and power purchase agreements (PPAs) now shape procurement, and wind and solar capacity is rising. However, build‑out rates and project pipelines do not by themselves indicate system performance. Outcomes depend on a set of binding constraints.

What prevents renewables from delivering reliable, affordable power?

Fragmented institutions and weak regulatory credibility raise counterparty risk and capital costs. Likewise, legacy grids and limited flexibility constrain the system value of variable renewables, leading to congestion and curtailment. Climate-driven hydrological volatility further undermines the reliability and political feasibility of water-linked assets and regional power trade. These pressures reinforce one another, making the central challenge the governance of an interdependent socio-technical system rather than a narrow technological constraint.

How to lower investor risk sustainably?

Central Asian governments have adopted renewable energy strategies and policy frameworks, alongside auction mechanisms and public–private partnership arrangements. In practice, however, fragmented institutions and regulatory gaps have limited progress. For example, Kazakhstan’s auction model predefines project sites and then awards them to private bidders under government-backed PPAs. This design has driven down tariffs (recent solar bids fell to ~15.93 tenge/kWh, ~USD 0.033), but its success hinges on the credibility of the off-taker and regulator. In Uzbekistan, a 100 MW solar plant was developed under a PPA and government support agreement (GSA) with Masdar. Increasingly, these pilot successes are catalysing further investment, pointing to a gradual scaling-up of utility-scale renewables across the region. To sustain investor confidence while limiting fiscal risk, governments should use standardized contracts, ensure transparent procurement, and offer targeted credit support only when projects meet clear governance milestones.

What limits effective regional power coordination today?

At the regional level, coordination remains uneven, but recent developments point to a gradual rebuilding of cooperative practices. During the Soviet period, the Coordinating Dispatch Center in Tashkent coordinated seasonal power flows across an integrated Central Asian grid. After independence, the Central Asian Power System (CAPS) fragmented as countries shifted toward national energy systems and bilateral arrangements, weakening formal coordination and reducing reliability. In recent years, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have invested in cross-border transmission and grid upgrades, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been reconnected to CAPS, partially restoring the technical ability to operate the system jointly. However, electricity exchanges among active members of the energy network remain mostly bilateral and project-based, and system operators continue to rely on informal coordination during periods of seasonal stress. Turning renewed technical links into stable regional cooperation requires basic institutional steps: regular data exchange between system operators, clear rules for seasonal dispatch and reserve sharing, and simple regional procedures for managing system imbalances and emergencies.

How does water governance affect power system reliability?

Complementary progress on water-management governance likewise points to the practical possibility of cooperation when incentives are aligned. At the level of basin management, the five countries’ Intergovernmental Water Commission (MKVK) has adopted explicit water-use limits and joint operating regimes for major reservoirs (notably the Bakhri Tojik/Tajik “sea”) for the 2025–26 cycle; those protocols allocate concrete volumes across riparians and establish seasonal operating rules that both reduce acute shortage risk and create a predictable planning baseline for downstream power and irrigation needs. For example, the Syr Darya inter-seasonal allocations for 2026 specify exact cubic-meter quotas for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and limit total withdrawals in a way intended to preserve ecological flows and irrigation security. The existence of binding operating rules suggests that highlighting the costs of non-cooperation can support policy efforts to foster enforceable cooperation in the electricity sector.

Infrastructure gaps in power system modernisation

Infrastructural shortcomings further constrain renewables. Much of Central Asia’s grid dates from the mid-20th century and is technologically outdated; transmission and distribution losses average roughly 9% – nearly double OECD norms. The complexity of integrating renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind due to their variability, further complicates the integration process. A large share of intermittent renewables demands flexible grid control, stronger interconnections and adequate storage or backup systems. Currently, most countries lack adequate reserve capacity and automated controls to manage fluctuations in energy supply.

Greater regional interconnection could alleviate renewable variability by distributing intermittent generation across a wider network, but the required investment is substantial, encompassing not only new cross-border transmission lines but also modern dispatch centers with real-time monitoring and control systems. Given fiscal constraints, Central Asian governments are unable to finance these upgrades independently and therefore rely on external sources of capital.

External financing models and infrastructure outcomes

Different financing channels imply distinct development pathways. The European Union, through the Global Gateway initiative, emphasizes green financing, regulatory alignment and technical assistance, including support for hydropower modernization and grid planning under the EU–Central Asia 2025 agenda. By contrast, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a central generator of large loans for implementing transmission lines and major infrastructure developments - and it depends on its own political banks and state contracting agencies. Simultaneously, Multilateral Development Banks (in this case primarily ADB and the World Bank) are providing specific grants and initiatives on reconnection and upgrades to transmission, such as the reconnection of Tajikistan to CAPS and research/projects to enhance transmission in the region. As a result, infrastructure development strategies in Central Asia reflect a trade-off between capital availability, implementation timelines and long-term operational and fiscal risks. Grid expansion is therefore shaped not only by technical necessity but also by the institutional and financial frameworks attached to different external partners.

Strategic implications of export-oriented electricity infrastructure

Alongside these financing dynamics, the region is also moving toward more export-oriented electricity strategies. Uzbekistan plans to begin exporting surplus green electricity to Europe via partner states from 2030, while proposals for an HVDC link across the Caspian would, if realized, connect Central Asia directly to European markets. Financing decisions increasingly embed transmission projects within broader trade, revenue, and geopolitical strategies, requiring corresponding adjustments in infrastructure policy and planning.

From operational failures to systemic risk

Even with adequate financing, physical integration must be accompanied by operational coordination. In the absence of common market rules and predefined crisis protocols, interconnected systems remain vulnerable to misalignment under stress. The January 2022 regional blackout affecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan illustrates how unsynchronized dispatch and limited reserve-sharing can trigger system-wide failures. This episode underscores the importance of harmonized operating standards, real-time data exchange and joint emergency procedures as integral components of a resilient regional power system.

How will climate change constrain Central Asia’s water and energy security?

Climate change poses a material threat to Central Asia’s water and energy endowments. Regional temperatures have already risen (≈0.5°C over the past 30 years) and this figure could rise by 2.0-5.7 degrees by the end of this century, if no changes are made. As a result, glaciers in the Tien Shan and Pamir have retreated rapidly, losing about 30% of their volume over the past 50–60 years. These hydrological shifts translate directly into energy vulnerabilities: the World Bank projects up to a 20% fall in hydropower output in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the ADB estimates basin run-off could drop 10–15% by 2050 due to glacier shrinkage and altered precipitation. Already, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan experience chronic winter deficits, when peak demand coincides with seasonal low flows. Likewise, declining water availability in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins could result in an annual water shortfall of around 15 billion m³ for Uzbekistan by 2050 without revised allocation arrangements.

How can climate risks be managed in water-dependent power systems?

While recent basin-level agreements demonstrate that cooperation is feasible when incentives align, rising climate variability and large-scale hydropower projects are increasing the stakes of regional water diplomacy. Large-scale projects such as the Rogun Dam illustrate the growing demands placed on regional water-energy governance. With a planned capacity of 3,600 MW, the project supports Tajikistan’s clean energy objectives and its ambition to expand electricity exports; at the same time, increasing climate variability reinforces the importance of adaptive and flexible water management. Large-scale hydropower presents material social and ecological externalities that complicate its classification as “green.” Emerging technologies like hydrogen electrolysis also consume significant water, potentially competing with agriculture. These constraints highlight the limits of relying on water-intensive energy pathways alone and strengthen the case for diversifying the region’s clean energy mix. Taken together, wind and solar can form a stable part of the power mix only when supported by adequate balancing capacity and modern system operation. Hydropower, thermal generation and emerging storage technologies therefore remain integral to maintaining reliability as renewable shares increase.

Co-benefits of renewables beyond decarbonisation

Cleaner power also yields clear co-benefits for public health and energy security. Urban air pollution from coal and old heating systems contributes to high PM2.5-related mortality in many cities. Replacing diesel back-up and aging coal plants with renewables would reduce this burden and improve livability. Renewables also reduce exposure to fossil-fuel supply shocks. Uzbekistan’s gas output, for example, fell from about 60 bcm in 2018 to roughly 45 bcm in 2024, underscoring the value of expanding domestic low-carbon capacity.

Key findings

Central Asia’s renewable resource base and growing project pipeline create a genuine opportunity for more secure, cleaner power systems. Realising that opportunity depends on factors that extend well beyond turbine and panel deployment. Contractual clarity and regulator credibility influence investor pricing and the volume of private capital that can be mobilised. Grid modernisation and operational flexibility determine how much variable generation the system can absorb without excessive curtailment or reliability loss. External financing choices shape procurement models, implementation speed and fiscal exposure. Climate-driven changes in river flows reframe the role of hydropower as a balancing asset and raise the political salience of water allocation.

Policy priorities

These findings point to a set of interlocking priorities. First, improving the legal and institutional basis for long-term contracts and predictable settlement reduces payment and policy risk. Second, targeted investments in dispatch automation, forecasting and storage increase the operational value of wind and solar. Third, aligning financing instruments with capacity-building and transparent procurement limits adverse fiscal outcomes. Fourth, integrating water management into energy planning transforms hydropower from an uncertain buffer into an element of coordinated system operation. Finally, durable cross-border arrangements for data exchange, reserve sharing and emergency response make interconnection a source of resilience rather than contagion.

Conclusion

With sustained policy focus and credible resource commitments, renewables can evolve from pilot projects into a dependable pillar of Central Asia’s power systems and a more stable basis for regional electricity exchange. Without addressing these shortcomings, expansion is likely to remain piecemeal, boosting installed capacity figures without materially improving system reliability or resilience.

Author: Emil Azikaev, 1st-year Master’s student, School of Politics and International Relations, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China.