Uzbekistan pursues an exemplary multivector foreign policy and has established itself as one of the principal mediators in Central Asia. As a bridge country between East and West and a central element of the historic Silk Road, Uzbekistan and Central Asia occupy a pivotal geopolitical position. Consequently, both Western and Eastern powers are actively competing to strengthen their bilateral relations with Uzbekistan.

The Importance of Central Asia Nowadays

Eighteen years ago, Blank, S. (2008) published an article entitled “The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View”, in which he sought to underline the importance of Central Asia at a time when the region was still largely unknown and underestimated worldwide. However, since the outbreak of the war between Ukraine and Russia, international interest in Central Asia has increased considerably, and academic as well as policy-oriented publications focusing on the region have experienced exponential growth.

Today, Central Asia is becoming vital for both geopolitical poles: the West and the East.

Alkuwaiti, M. A. S. (2022) writes that “the Central Asian area contains around 5.5% of the world’s hydro potential. Furthermore, over 20% of the world’s investigated uranium is located in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” Central Asian countries are rich in energy resources, including oil, coal, and natural gas. Following the energy crisis, Europe has come to fully understand the strategic importance of Central Asia for its own energy security.

It is important to recall that Central Asian states are considered reliable partners due to their stable foreign policies and their secure domestic investment environments, which inspire confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly true for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, whose internal investment policies are regarded as stable and predictable.

As for China, the construction of the New Silk Road has led Beijing to identify Central Asia as a region of reliable partners with whom it can trade and establish direct connections to Western markets. Through the implementation of new railway routes following the conflict in Ukraine, China seeks to diversify its transit corridors, reduce its dependence on both Russia and Kazakhstan, and sustain long-term rail trade with the European Union and Middle Eastern countries. This strategic context explains why China has developed a particularly strong interest in Uzbekistan.

Growing Importance of Uzbekistan

Two countries currently play a leading role in Central Asia: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, Turkmenistan is also gaining increasing importance along the New Silk Road, particularly due to its port on the Caspian Sea, the city of Turkmenbashi. Nevertheless, one country that attracted particular attention over the past year is Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan has stood out due to several high-level diplomatic engagements, including meetings with former U.S. President Donald Trump and the signing of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) in Brussels, finalized in the end of 2025. These developments illustrate the growing international recognition of Uzbekistan as a key regional actor.

Uzbekistan entered 2026 with an active diplomatic agenda, marked by official visits and international tours. Notably, the meeting between President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara highlights Uzbekistan’s determination to continue pursuing its multivector foreign policy. At the same time, it reflects the country’s strong ambition to further develop connectivity between the two continents of Europe and Asia.

The Successful Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has attracted increasing attention from experts due to its implementation of a balanced and equidistant approach toward global centers of power. Since the presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has experienced significant economic growth and a noticeable transformation in its diplomatic posture.

Indeed, since taking office in 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been framed as the architect of the "New Uzbekistan." His success is built on a strategic shift from isolationism to proactive modernization, combining economic liberalization with a carefully crafted image of a "people's president."

Today, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is characterized by openness and a clear willingness to integrate the country into global and regional cooperation and integration processes. According to Katpenova, A. Z. (2024), this approach can be defined by Uzbekistan’s consistent refusal to participate in military-political blocs, to host foreign military bases on its territory, or to engage in armed conflicts beyond its national borders.

The introduction of political reforms in Uzbekistan has played a crucial role in shaping its foreign policy orientation. These reforms have enabled the country to strengthen both intra-regional and extra-regional ties, resulting in the expansion of economic relations with key international partners, particularly the European Union, the United States, and China.

Since Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, Uzbekistan’s active foreign policy has increasingly aimed to support the successful implementation of the country’s domestic reform agenda. The government has set ambitious economic transformation goals, including achieving a gross domestic product (GDP) of $100 billion, exceeding $30 billion in exports, and ensuring that the private sector contributes 80% of the national GDP.

Furthermore, Uzbekistan aspires to reach upper-middle-income status in terms of GDP per capita and to secure membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) by 2030. These objectives underline the close link between Uzbekistan’s foreign policy strategy and its broader economic modernization agenda.

Growing Importance of Uzbekistan for China

In the context of the war in Ukraine and the increasingly complex relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s strategic significance within Central Asia has grown substantially from China’s perspective. Several analysts have emphasized this trend, including Yunis Sharifli, who authored an article entitled “Growing Importance of Uzbekistan for China.”

Sharifli, Y. (2022, October 4) argues that Uzbekistan’s political stability and its balanced diplomatic relations with both regional and global actors provide China with a valuable opportunity to diversify its partnerships and adopt a more nuanced and flexible approach toward Central Asia. According to the author, Tashkent represents a key partner for Beijing not only because of the strength of bilateral relations, but also due to Uzbekistan’s broader regional influence, which aligns closely with China’s long-term strategy in Central Asia.

The author further notes that Uzbekistan is increasingly viewed as a stable and promising emerging market within the region, enhancing its attractiveness for Chinese economic engagement. This growing relevance has been highlighted by The Jamestown Foundation, which underscores Uzbekistan’s rising strategic profile in Central Asia.

China has already expressed its intention to significantly expand trade with Uzbekistan, setting a target of reaching a bilateral trade volume of $10 billion in the near future. Several structural factors explain China’s strong and sustained interest in Uzbekistan.

First, Uzbekistan represents the most populous country in Central Asia. As living standards continue to improve, domestic consumption is expected to rise, resulting in increased demand for imported goods, including Chinese products.
Second, compared to other Central Asian economies, Uzbekistan possesses a relatively diversified economic structure. While the country has traditionally relied on the export of raw materials, future prospects suggest that Uzbekistan may expand its industrial output and develop new opportunities to export manufactured and semi-processed goods to China, thereby contributing to a higher overall trade volume.

These considerations help explain why Chinese President Xi Jinping has described Uzbekistan as “a major country at the geopolitical center of Central Asia.” He further emphasized that more than 2,000 years of friendly exchanges and three decades of mutually beneficial cooperation demonstrate that strengthening comprehensive China–Uzbekistan cooperation aligns with historical trends and serves the fundamental interests of both nations.

For his part, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated during a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit that “today, Uzbek–Chinese cooperation is becoming a model of pragmatic and balanced partnership, contributing to the sustainable development of the region and strengthening the role of the SCO as a platform for mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation.”

Two years after Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the presidency, Uzbekistan and China signed a comprehensive set of protocols in 2018 regarding phytosanitary requirements. These agreements facilitated the gradual expansion of Uzbek agricultural and food exports to the Chinese market. To date, Uzbekistan has received approval to export seventeen categories of such products, achieving leading positions in several of them.

Bilateral trade between the two countries accounted for approximately 17–20% of Uzbekistan’s total foreign trade, with the volume of commerce reaching $7.4 billion in 2021. From January to July 2022, trade between the two nations increased by 32.5% compared to the same period in 2021, reflecting strong growth in economic engagement.

The inaugural China–Central Asia Summit, held in Xi’an in May 2023, marked a significant turning point. The summit signaled China’s willingness to pursue a more autonomous regional role, independent of the Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework, as noted by Calabrese, J. (2025, July 3).

By 2023, China had become Uzbekistan’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 18% of the country’s total trade turnover. Major initiatives under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) improved Uzbekistan’s transport infrastructure and strengthened its export capabilities. In January 2024, President Mirziyoyev conducted a state visit to China, meeting with President Xi Jinping. According to the official website of the Uzbek General Consulate in Germany, this visit was a milestone event. An investment forum was organized during the visit, gathering heads of regional departments and more than 600 representatives of leading Chinese enterprises. This state visit elevated bilateral relations to an “all-weather” strategic partnership, deepening cooperation across multiple sectors, including trade, technology, and infrastructure (Zakirov, B., 2025, April 1).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Through this partnership, both countries have created favorable conditions to enhance bilateral commerce, encourage Chinese investment in major industrial and infrastructure projects, and develop collaboration in transportation and logistics sectors. Uzbekistan’s strategy to strengthen regional connectivity complements China’s broader foreign policy goals in Central Asia. Both countries actively participate in the SCO framework, jointly advancing regional security, trade development, and economic cooperation.

Uzbekistan regards the SCO as a strategic platform for attracting investment in renewable energy, developing mechanical engineering, and creating new transport corridors, according to Ilzat Kasimov, Deputy Minister of Investments, Industry, and Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan. These objectives illustrate the convergence of Uzbekistan’s national strategy with China’s regional ambitions, reinforcing the growing strategic importance of Uzbekistan for Beijing.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Key Chinese Investments in Uzbekistan

Landlocked countries face inherent challenges in accessing global markets, and Central Asian states are no exception. To overcome these structural constraints, countries like Uzbekistan have sought to enhance infrastructure and connectivity through regional integration and participation in global initiatives. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a transformative framework for Central Asia, providing funding, technical expertise, and infrastructural development that significantly improves the region’s connectivity. This makes cooperation between China and Uzbekistan critical to regional revitalization.

Khitakhunov, A. (2024) emphasizes that Uzbekistan is a key beneficiary of the BRI. The country actively participates in the initiative, maintains observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union, and strengthens economic engagement with South Asian partners. Collaborative efforts to promote the BRI underscore the high level of strategic partnership between China and Uzbekistan. Zilola Yunusova, Head of the Department of the Center for International Relations Studies under Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notes that Uzbekistan was among the first nations to support this megaproject, which aims to enhance international transport connectivity and foster broad trade, investment, and humanitarian exchanges.

The BRI has substantially strengthened Uzbekistan’s transport networks, reducing delivery times by nearly 15%—the most significant reduction among BRI participants. This improvement is projected to increase Uzbek exports by 13–23%, allowing local producers to access markets in China, Iran, South Asia, Europe, and Turkey more efficiently.

Key Chinese Investments in Uzbekistan

Chinese enterprises have demonstrated strong interest in investing in Uzbekistan and establishing joint ventures across multiple sectors. Investments are directed toward industries including oil and gas, chemicals, textiles, electricity, coal, cement, agriculture, water management, logistics, and industrial parks (Umarova, N., 2022, February 14).

As of January 1, 2024, Uzbekistan hosted 14,053 joint ventures and foreign enterprises (Khitakhunov, A., 2024). According to the National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, China accounted for nearly 40% of foreign investment and external financing in 2025, totaling approximately $10 billion out of $25 billion in total inflows.

In recent years, Chinese investment in Uzbekistan has increased fivefold. In the first quarter of 2024, China became the top foreign investor in Uzbekistan, accounting for 23% of total foreign investment, followed by Russia (13.8%) and Türkiye (8.5%). Research indicates that Uzbekistan mainly exports raw materials such as mineral fuels and cotton to China, while its imports from China consist predominantly of machinery, equipment, and chemical products. Specifically, machinery and equipment represent 65% of imports, with chemical products accounting for 15% (Katpenova, A. Z., 2024).

This trade pattern highlights a clear economic interdependence: Uzbekistan provides natural resources, while China supplies industrial goods and technological equipment. It is important to emphasize that trade and economic cooperation between the two nations has displayed a positive and growing dynamic, with significant prospects for further expansion.

Heybatov, T. (2026, January 28) reports that over 4,800 Chinese-invested enterprises are currently registered in Uzbekistan, representing more than a quarter of all foreign-invested companies. In 2025 alone, Chinese investors established over 1,500 new enterprises, surpassing the combined total of all other foreign partners.

Key projects include the construction of combined-cycle gas power plants, wind energy facilities, and major initiatives in the automotive and ceramics industries. These investments have contributed to job creation, industrial modernization, and technological advancement (Katpenova, A. Z., 2024).

Cooperation in the Automotive and Green Energy Sectors

Uzbekistan and Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD plan to establish a joint research center, develop EV standards, and produce Blade batteries and electric buses. Additionally, BYD and UzAuto Motors have announced intentions to manufacture electric vehicles and assemble Chinese Chery cars in Uzbekistan. In December 2023, Chinese firm Henan Suda signed an agreement with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy to build up to 50,000 EV charging stations nationwide by 2033, serving approximately 700,000 vehicles upon completion according to Eurasianet. The agreement was reached during a recent meeting between Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry and the representatives of the Сhinese company.

Energy represents another cornerstone of Chinese involvement. Over recent years, multiple agreements have been signed to construct solar and wind power plants with capacities measured in gigawatts. A single wind project in the Bukhara region is designed for up to 500 MW. Chinese firms are also contributing to battery storage systems, grid modernization, and hydropower projects (Heybatov, 2026, January 28).

Green energy cooperation has expanded further. In February 2023, Uzbekistan signed agreements with Energy China and Huaneng Renewables to construct solar photovoltaic and photoelectric power plants, respectively (Kun.uz, December 16, 2022; Tashkent Times, February 15; Uzdaily.com, February 20).

Finally, Uzbekistan launches a $350mn industrial project in Andijan with Chinese partnership according to Daryo. The project will focus on the production of construction materials and chemical products.

In sum, Chinese investment is accelerating Uzbekistan’s industrialization, boosting exports, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and introducing modern equipment, engineering expertise, and advanced management practices.

China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway Project

On June 6, 2024, the governments of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed an intergovernmental agreement in Beijing to construct the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. This project represents one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure initiatives in Central Asia. By enhancing Uzbekistan’s transport connectivity, the CKU railway is expected to reduce delivery costs, accelerate trade, and significantly increase export capacity. Chinese foreign direct investment has played a crucial role in supporting this initiative, particularly in the infrastructure and energy sectors.

The CKU railway will transform trade and transit routes across Eurasia. Being landlocked, Central Asian states face structural disadvantages that limit their competitiveness. This railway addresses these limitations by creating a reliable overland corridor connecting China to Central Asia and beyond.

Uzbekistan has pursued a proactive policy in promoting the CKU railway. Its efforts align with China’s broader connectivity strategy in Central Asia and with regional initiatives aimed at integrating Afghanistan into the regional economy. Sharifli, Y. (2022, October 4) emphasizes that Uzbekistan’s engagement in these projects supports China’s broader goal of connecting Afghanistan to Central Asian countries, enhancing trade routes and regional stability.

During a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting, Uzbekistan presented its 2022–2026 strategic plan, emphasizing the enhancement of economic ties with China as part of the country’s “New Uzbekistan Development Strategy.” A central component of this plan is the CKU railway, intended to strengthen connectivity and provide greater access to South Asian markets. For Uzbekistan, this corridor represents a major opportunity to position itself as a key Eurasian transit hub.

In summary, Uzbekistan is critical to the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway Project because it acts as the central hub connecting China directly to the markets of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, effectively bypassing conventional routes through Russia and Kazakhstan. As the region's largest economy and final destination for many shipments, it ensures the route's financial viability, reducing transit times and cargo costs by roughly 20% compared to existing options.

Conclusion

In recent years, the bilateral relationship between Uzbekistan and China has demonstrated remarkable dynamism. The partnership spans political dialogue, security cooperation, and comprehensive economic engagement. Uzbekistan has successfully leveraged Chinese foreign direct investment to diversify its economy, modernize key industries, and develop infrastructure. The strategic alignment between Uzbekistan and China is reinforced by shared priorities, including transport connectivity, energy development, and regional economic integration. Uzbekistan’s multivector foreign policy and proactive participation in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative have positioned the country as a central actor in Central Asia, capable of serving as both a regional hub and a bridge between East and West.

Uzbekistan has a crucial role for China regarding the following facts :

(1) Geopolitical Strategic Hub ;

(2) Economic Driver: With a GDP of roughly $105 billion in 2024, Uzbekistan provides the necessary cargo volume (both import/export) to sustain the project;

(3) Reduced Transit Time and Costs: Currently, shipping from China to Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan can take 45–70 days. The CKU project, traversing through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, offers a faster and more cost-effective direct route;

(4) Infrastructure Connectivity: Uzbekistan already possesses developed rail infrastructure that can be integrated with the new lines to unlock landlocked Central Asian regions;

(5) Geopolitical Diversification.

That's the reason why Uzbekistan is a critical strategic bridge in Eurasia, serving as a vital link between China and Europe due to its central geography and rich resources. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is the only country bordering all other Central Asian nations plus Afghanistan, its stability and infrastructure are crucial for regional security and logistics and this strategic position made it a bridge between continents and countries.

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