It took 613 days of deadlock, three days of conclave, and maximum institutional pressure for Brussels to finally see white smoke rise. Meeting since Tuesday morning at the Fondation Universitaire, negotiators from MR, PS, Les Engagés, Groen, Vooruit, CD&V, and Anders reached a government agreement, bringing an end to one of the longest political paralyses in the Region’s history.

The image, carefully staged by formateur Georges-Louis Bouchez, evokes the Vatican. But behind the symbolism lies a harsher reality: this government is born under budgetary constraint, institutional pressure, and in a climate of persistent political fracture.

A Majority Solid on Paper, Fragile in Political Legitimacy

The coalition brings together 55 MPs out of 89, with a majority in both linguistic groups:

ï 46 seats out of 72 on the French-speaking side

ï 9 seats out of 17 on the Dutch-speaking side

Institutionally, the majority is unquestionable. Politically, it is already facing criticism.

Some parties now at the center of power suffered electoral setbacks, while other emerging forces strengthened by the ballot were excluded from the process. This gap between electoral legitimacy and institutional legitimacy represents one of the first structural weaknesses of the future executive.

After two years of caretaker governance, Brussels finally has a government. But above all, it is a government of necessity.

Metro 3 Frozen: Budgetary Reality Catches Up With Political Ambition

The most dramatic shift concerns the Metro 3 project, long presented as the backbone of Brussels’ future mobility.

Contrary to initial ambitions, the project has not been formally abandoned but placed on long-term structural pause. Certain works already underway will continue in order to avoid technical, legal, or financial complications.

This freeze amounts to an implicit acknowledgment: Brussels no longer has, in the short term, the financial capacity to carry such a large-scale infrastructure project alone.

In its place, the majority now favors a tram-based solution to complete the transport loop. This marks a profound strategic shift: the capital is temporarily stepping away from heavy infrastructure in favor of a more flexible and financially sustainable model.

This is not merely a technical adjustment. It is a doctrinal shift.

Good Move Disappears: The End of a Politically Toxic Symbol

Another major decision: the Good Move plan will be renamed and fundamentally recalibrated.

Originally designed to transform urban mobility, the plan gradually became a focal point of social and political tensions. Contested in several municipalities, criticized by residents, and politicized by opponents, it evolved into a symbol of the widening gap between institutions and citizens.

The future government is not abandoning the objective of improving mobility. But it is burying the brand.

This rebranding aims to defuse a structural political conflict while preserving a mobility policy adapted to modern urban constraints.

Central Objective: Return to Budgetary Balance by 2029

At the heart of the agreement lies a financial imperative.

The Region has committed to a trajectory toward a balanced budget by 2029, with a cumulative adjustment effort of approximately €1 billion over the legislative term.

This effort will rely on:

ï structural spending reductions,

ï rationalization of public expenditures,

ï redefinition of investment priorities,

ï and reforms designed to stabilize regional finances sustainably.

With debt approaching €16 billion, Brussels no longer has room for error.

This objective is both an economic necessity and a political credibility test.

Cleanliness, Security, and Governance: Restoring Authority in a Fragilized Region

The future executive also intends to act on the most visible dimensions of Brussels’ institutional decline:

ï strengthening security,

ï improving urban cleanliness,

ï stabilizing key public institutions,

ï restoring administrative efficiency.

These priorities reflect a clear reality: Brussels is experiencing a gradual erosion of institutional authority and public trust.

The new government will have to restore that credibility.

Fouad Ahidar and the Opposition: “I Fear the Worst”

The reaction from Fouad Ahidar illustrates the tensions that remain.

In his view, this agreement comes after the Region reached critical debt levels and endured more than two years of paralysis. He points out that several parties now in power contributed to the current situation.

His warning is unequivocal: the opposition will remain vigilant, confront the government, and demand accountability.

Beyond political criticism, this reflects a broader concern among part of the population regarding the government’s ability to reverse Brussels’ trajectory.

White Smoke, but Not Yet a Rebirth

This agreement ends a historic deadlock. It restores Brussels’ ability to govern and act institutionally.

But it does not resolve everything.

The new government inherits a Region weakened financially, politically, and socially. It will have to make difficult choices, balance fiscal discipline with social stability, and restore trust in institutions that have been deeply eroded.

The white smoke marks the end of paralysis.

It also marks the beginning of the real test.

Editor’s Note:
In Brussels, losing does not disqualify you—it repositions you. Vooruit, CD&V, and Anders, despite electoral setbacks, now sit at the heart of government. The lesson is stark: it is not electoral score that governs, but coalition arithmetic and the linguistic key.

Kadir Duran
Bruxelles Korner