The sequence is familiar. An American president signals preference for negotiation, allows indirect diplomatic channels to surface — Geneva, Oman, regional mediation — and then pivots toward military action under the banner of a higher imperative: international security, regional stability, non-proliferation.

On 28 February 2026, Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, followed almost immediately by U.S. military engagement in the Gulf, were not a strategic accident. They were the culmination of calibrated pressure applied over several weeks: large-scale naval deployments, deliberately ambiguous rhetoric, and a calculated alternation between diplomatic openness and explicit threat.Amethodratherthan an impulse.

The Doctrine of the “Conditional Stick”

Donald Trump long maintained that compromise remained possible. Indirect talks did occur. Yet the communication architecture reveals a structured escalation:

•Assertion ofpreference for negotiation

•Questioning of Iranian “good faith”

•Signals of presidential impatience

•Pre-legitimization of military force

This rhetorical construction mirrors earlier precedents. In 2003, the political mechanism was similar: present all alternatives as exhausted, then frame military action as reluctant necessity.

The Shadow of the Bush Era

Comparison with George W. Bush is unavoidable. In 2003, Iraq was framed as a global threat. In 2026, Iran is portrayedas a systemic destabilizer:

•Support forregionalmilitias

•Ambiguousnucleartrajectory

•Expandingballisticcapabilities

The difference lies in the geopolitical environment. In 2003, the United States acted as an uncontested hyperpower. In 2026, Washington operates within a multipolar system — a vigilant China, an opportunistic Russia, and a divided Europe.

Strategic Alignment with Israel

For Israel, long advocating structural weakening of Iran, American military entry constitutes a decisive force multiplier. The move satisfies Israeli strategic doctrine and reinforces the image of a U.S. president unwilling to project weakness.

Global Interests or Domestic Calculus?

Foreign intervention often intersects with domestic political timing:

•Rally-around-the-flagdynamics

•Media agendadisplacement

•Internalpolitical recalibration

With midterm elections approaching, external confrontation can serve consolidation purposes. U.S. history demonstrates that foreign policy sometimes functions as an instrument of internal stabilization.

Expert View: United States – Iran (China Factor)

Tonyukuk Boran

Diplomatic Phase

The first round of U.S.–Iran negotiations took place on 6 February 2026 in Oman, under the strategic shadow of the USSAbraham Lincoln carrier strike group. Leakedinformationsuggests discussions centeredon:

•Termination of Iraniannuclearactivities

•Restrictions onballistic missile development

•Potential limitation or suspension of Iranian oil exports to China

Talks resumed in Geneva on 17 February under Omani mediation. Both sides publicly reaffirmed commitment to diplomacy.

Military Movements

1. United States

Naval Deployment

Alongside theAbraham Lincoln, theGerald R. Ford carrier group is deploying. Some estimates indicate up to one-third of operational U.S. naval capacity is positioned with Iran as focal point, despite maintenance constraints.

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers could engage from the Eastern Mediterranean or Red Sea.

Missile Defense Architecture

•THAAD systems positioned in Jordan and Israel

•UAE and Saudi THAAD potentially integrated

•AEGIS-equipped destroyers reinforcingcoverage

This configuration indicates substantial defensive posture against Iranian ballistic capabilities.

Logistics

Open-source intelligence reports over 250 U.S. military airlift rotations to the region. Civilian maritime flows remain opaque.

Caspian Radar Gaps

Unverified reports suggest U.S. transport aircraft temporarily disappearing from tracking systems over the Caspian Sea, hinting at discreet operational preparations. Afghanistan is speculated as a potential special-operations platform.

2. Iran

Following the so-called “12-day war,” unconfirmed reports indicate acquisition of Chinese radar and air-defense systems. Russian and Chinese military air traffic toward Iran has increased.

Joint Russia-China naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February triggered negative reaction from Washington.

Iran and China: The Strategic Link

With Venezuelan oil access curtailed after Nicolás Maduro’s arrest, China’s reliance on Iranian supply becomes more strategic. Marginalizing Iran would increase Beijing’s dependence on Russia — a structural vulnerability.

The Sino-Iranian relationship is longstanding. Reports reference ballistic technology transfers via North Korea. The 2011 capture of the U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone, allegedly examined by Chinese specialists, remains illustrative.

U.S. intelligence has also indicated that at least one GBU-57 bunker-buster reportedly failed to detonate, raising concerns of technological exploitation.

A failed U.S. strike against Iran would have implications beyond the Middle East — particularly for American credibility in the Taiwan theater.

Political Objectives

For Washington

•FormalIraniancommitment to cease uranium enrichment

•Ballistic program limitation

•Strategic reduction of Chinese access to Iranian oil

Success strengthens domestic positioning before midterms. High casualties or prolonged engagement risks congressional erosion.

For Tehran

Primary objective: regime survival and sanction relief.

Failure of diplomacy under U.S. conditions could precipitate large-scale strikes, potentially implying regime-change ambitions.

China’s Strategic Posture

Facing perceived U.S. encirclement, Beijing may leverage Iran indirectly through:

•Intelligence support

•Satellitepositioning

•Electronicwarfare assistance

Damage to symbolic U.S. assets stealth aircraft, carrier groups would represent a major strategic gain for China.

Structural Risk

External military pressure often consolidates internal cohesion rather than fracture it. The assumption that escalation will provoke regime collapse is historically unreliable.

Three references illuminate the broader dynamic:

•Süleyman Demirel: “No government can withstand an empty pot.”

•Peter Drucker: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.”

•Sun Tzu:“Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

This triangular confrontation — United States, Iran, China — is not merely military. It concerns systemic balance, internal resilience, and global power architecture.

The Middle East is entering a phase of managed instability. History suggests such phases rarely remain contained.

Kadir Duran
Bruxelles Korner